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 When a glorious moment arrives 
Do trust yourself no more. 
A changing world, a complex world, 
Yet simple is the model of yours. 




In this chapter I propose that we need to reassess the development of the Soviet decision 
sciences after World War II as an important intellectual field where innovative and influential 
forms of conceptualizing the governance were created. By decision sciences I refer to 
different scientific, often quantitative techniques developed in the fields of the operations 
research, game theory and systems analysis which offer a cognitive procedure for arriving at 
a better judgment. Decision sciences are part of a wider field that is often described as 
“policy sciences” and “management sciences” in Western literature. In the Soviet context 
these terms are captured by a Russian notion nauchnoe upravlenie (best translated as 
scientific governance, which includes but is not limited to scientific management), an 
approach that emerged in the early twentieth century, was capitalized on during the 
communist revolution, cracked down by Stalin in the 1930s-1940s to be rehabilitated from 
the mid-1950s.2 
Somewhat counterintuitively, the development of Soviet decision sciences was not 
limited to aiding the Communist Party government to find the most preferable course of 
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action. To the contrary, I show in this chapter that the history of Soviet decision-sciences of 
the 1960s-1980s contains important moments that can be interpreted as reflecting the 
incremental liberalization of an authoritarian political regime. From the 1960s onward, 
several influential Soviet decision scientists used decision science to develop a kind of 
alternative social science, seeking to explain social order and social change and offering a 
much more complex representation of social processes than could, for instance, Soviet 
sociologists, restricted by Marxist-Leninist ideological dogmas.3 Soviet decision scientists 
used insights from the operations research and systems analysis to conceptualize government 
as a de-personalized process of continuous adaptation to an ever-changing environment. In so 
doing, Soviet decision scientists addressed many of the Western concerns discussed 
elsewhere in this volume, including human irrationality and mass participation in 
government.  
Although this story of Soviet decision science is fascinating in itself, there is an 
important intellectual rationale to extend our inquiry into modern intellectual technologies of 
government beyond Western case studies.4 In order to understand a full range of political 
implications of decision sciences, it is important to address the transnational dimension of 
their history. On the one hand, while there is an important intellectual history emerging about 
the ways in which scientific models of complex order and control spilled over into political 
imagination, these works tend to focus mainly on the West. The developments in the state 
socialist bloc are analyzed as either a deviation from or a peculiar adaptation of “Western 
ideas”.5 On the other hand, many historians traced the conceptual and institutional origins of 
decision sciences in the West, primarily in the US, Britain and France, seeking to deconstruct 
what is understood as a neoliberal governmentality, a governmental regime that relies on the 
notions of instrumental rationality, responsibilization of the individual, as well as extension 
of practices of calculation and market regulation to wide areas of social and political life.6 In 
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this context, decision sciences become a suspect form of scientific expertise, a form which 
seeks to limit popular participation in politics. However, as I show in my Soviet case, there is 
also another side of decision science, one that bridges scientific governance and the liberal 
idea of self-regulation in a way that is not limited to the genealogy of the late twentieth 
century’s neoliberalism.  
Thus I propose that decision sciences, a quantitative technique of governance that 
tend to be attributed to neoliberal governmentality, have a political a history of its own, 
which should not be reduced to either to Cold War technocracy or neoliberal political 
economy. First, decision sciences are a large, internally heterogeneous field, where different 
methodologies put different emphasis on predictability, measurability and uncertainty. Their 
implications to what is rational, to the notions of individual agency and structure and the 
character of social order can therefore differ quite significantly. Moreover and second, as I 
show in this chapter, in different contexts decision sciences can have different political 
effects. For instance, some Soviet decision scientists developed a rather liberal model of 
limited government, a model which in the context of personalist, authoritarian government of 
the Communist Party should not necessarily be interpreted as a precursor solely to neoliberal 
regime, but rather a moment in the development of late modern governmentality.  
I draw on the Foucaultian governmentality approach to situate the history of Soviet 
decision sciences in the long evolution what is described by Foucaultians as the art of 
government. According to Mitchell Dean, art of governing refers to “an activity which 
requires craft, imagination, shrewd fashioning, the use of tacit skills and practical know how, 
the employment of intuition and so on”.7 By using the governmentality perspective, we can 
begin to understand decision sciences as not only a formal exercise in designing quantitative 
applications, but a multifaceted activity that is best approached as an assemblage of 
conceptual principles, institutions and reflexive practices. In his series of lectures at the 
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Collège de France, Michel Foucault links the emergence of the art of government with the 
advent of the modern liberal state, which developed intellectual and disciplinary techniques 
that enabled governance at a distance, which was made possible by acknowledging the power 
of self-regulation to the governed subjects and objects.8 As I show, in the Soviet context it 
was the field of decision sciences which was conducive to a more liberal governmental 
imagination that underscored the principles of self-regulation, limited central control and 
governance at a distance.  
This contention needs some clarification though. It is remarkable though just how 
different the liberal effect of decision sciences could be in different political contexts. In 
order to appreciate this I propose going beyond the generic criticisms of scientific 
technocracy. Many histories of the decision scientists’ communities emphasize their 
fascination with and even fetishism of numbers, precision, determinism and computer 
technology. However, there were other decision scientists who were less concerned with 
deterministic, technical solutions, instead focusing on problem making than solving. But this 
latter strand of decision sciences so far has received much less attention from historians. This 
becomes particularly clear when we consider the emerging concern with governing global 
biosphere both in East and West from the late 1960s. This concern drew on the ideas 
emerging across different disciplines, such as the traditional liberal idea of self-regulation in 
the political thought but also its siblings in the theories of biological systems and ecology, the 
emerging organization theory of bounded rationality in human decision-making developed by 
Herbert Simon, and the mathematical models of non-linear dynamics, developed in the 
complex systems sciences. Recent studies began disentangle the genealogy of self-regulation 
under uncertainty: examples can be found in the recent work by Stephen Collier and Andrew 
Lakoff on the history of government of vital systems, Helga Nowotny’s and Louise Amoore’s 
work on reflexive, prediction-based governance and uncertainty, my own study on the global 
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application of the systems approach while others outlined genealogies of resilience.9 In a 
similar vein, in this chapter I show that according to Soviet decision scientists, to govern a 
complex system—and Soviet society was increasingly understood as a complex system that 
included human and non-human actors—meant to rely on qualitative methods and 
postpositivist epistemology abandoning the utopia of linear planning. Furthermore, there 
were strands of Soviet decision science that transcended the laboratory approach, according 
to which scientists delivered their ready-made models to policy makers. Instead, some Soviet 
scientists cultivated a study of decision as a reflexive social science, an art of participatory 
government, hoping that this would enable to break the Party’s and bureaucratic monopoly on 
decision-making. It is precisely this thrust of Soviet decision science that I want to draw 
attention to as it constitutes an important correction in the existing debates on scientific 
technocracy as trajectory that leads to a non-democratic regime of governance.10  
This chapter is organized as following. First, I map the transnational development of 
decision sciences s during the postwar period in order to demonstrate the parallels of the 
origins, spread and institutionalization of decision sciences in both the East and West. In the 
1940s, decision sciences were developed in both the Soviet and U.S. military-industrial 
complexes, formed an important part of Cold War competition, and later spilled over into the 
civilian realm. In the Soviet Union, this spill-over coincided with de-Stalinization, the 
abolishment of the personality cult of the leader, which led to a period characterized by the 
softening of internal ideological control and the re-establishment of connections with the 
West. I trace this shift by describing the institutionalization of Soviet operations research 
(OR) and systems analysis during the post-Stalinist period of the 1950s-1970s. The Soviet 
decision sciences were practiced not only by academics: decision sciences were introduced 
into the policy process after 1964, as part and parcel of the attempt to increase the scientific 
level of national planning, an initiative that was led by the Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin.11 
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Finally, I close the chapter with a discussion of an important contribution to the Soviet 
decision sciences: the writings and institutional entrepreneurship of the prominent Russian 
mathematician Nikita N. Moiseev, who promoted the fields of OR research and computer-
based modelling of the geophysical system, most famously in the case of the simulation of 
environmental effects of nuclear war in 1983-1985. The case of Moiseev speaks volumes 
about both the institutional structure of Soviet science, which harbored islands of 
permissibility for maverick ideas, but also the internationalization of Soviet governmental 
thought where new notions of government and control were pursued in cooperation with 
Western counterparts. 
 
Revisiting the history of Soviet governance  
Before we proceed, several important implications of my argument for Soviet history must be 
addressed. Studies of Soviet governance have been traditionally divided into two approaches. 
One approach concentrated on the role of dictatorial, personalized decision-making in the 
social system, focusing on the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
and the nomenclature, as they were regarded by scholars as the key governmental actors. 
Known originally as “Kremlinology”, this approach was enriched by institutionalists in the 
1990s, who remained interested in the role of personalities, power struggles among individual 
Soviet actors and their coalitions.12 Other scholars who emerged as early as in 1970s, 
collectively comprising the so-called “modernization school”, focused on lower level actors, 
such as regional leaders, managers, and scientific experts, and dedicated themselves to 
investigating whether a new Soviet technocratic class capable of challenging the hegemony 
of the Party was emerging.13 Both of these approaches emphasized the importance of 
personalities in political and organizational contexts, seeking to identify the “real” decision-
makers in a given situation and assess their significance and impact in the future. This 
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epistemological orientation left policy sciences, which I call the arts of governance, outside 
the scope of Soviet historiography. The history of Soviet science and technology, albeit well 
developed, never made it into the mainstream political history of the Soviet regime. While 
historians and political scientists examined the strategic uses of Marxist-Leninist ideology in 
the framing of governmental programs and decisions, the complex role played by decision 
sciences s in Soviet governance was completely left out. Even with the rising interest in Cold 
War technocracies in East and West but also the global South,14 the internal intellectual, 
institutional, and political diversity of the field of Soviet decision science has been hardly 
ever seriously considered as a defining feature of late Soviet governmentality. 
Therefore, to admit that the Soviet policy sciences were not hostage to communist 
ideology, but in fact represented relatively autonomous intellectual resource for 
heterogeneous notions of order and control, as I do here, is to question some of the central 
established narratives in Soviet history. My approach is close to those scholars, such as 
Stephen Collier, who have emphasized the complexity of Soviet governmentality, where 
power and control did not flow in a top-down, linear way, but was rather diffused, where 
expert knowledge and material infrastructure could shape and constrain the scope of the 
activity of the Party elites.15 Indeed, a growing body of recent literature on Soviet governance 
has documented persistent discrepancies between the supposed prevalence of centralized 
planning and the actual use, or lack thereof, of scientific expertise and local management 
practices. We now know, for example, that the annual and five-year plans were not “decided” 
by the CPSU leadership, but rather settled through an informal bargaining process between 
the All-Union State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and representatives of branch ministries 
and industry enterprises.16 Accordingly, while some prominent computer scientists, such as 
Viktor Glushkov, who initiated a technoutopian attempt to centralize and computerize 
information processing in this defunct Soviet system through OGAS, an All-Union 
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Automation System, failed to formalize the Soviet institutions,17 other Soviet experts of 
decision making commanded an increasing authority from the 1980s. While I described such 
cases in the fields of regional and global modelling and strategic management in Soviet 
Russia,18 here I develop further my argument by demonstrating the way in which Soviet 
decision sciences were constructed as a critical social thought. 
Furthermore, to focus on political implications of decision sciences means to use a 
particular notion of power. There is a tendency among Soviet historians to study the relation 
between scientists, experts and governing communist political elites as an unfolding conflict, 
a zero-sum power game. Consider, for example, the many studies of scientific autonomy in 
such fields as physics or mathematical economics, which posit that this autonomy was only 
achieved at the cost of a “real”, demonstrable influence on actual governmental decisions.19 
In turn, increasing authority and power over decision making of scientists was interpreted as 
the loss of power of the Party’s governing elites. Consider the fate of Soviet cybernetics. 
From the 1960s, according to Slava Gerovitch, the principles of cybernetic theory of 
predictive control were used to re-conceptualize Soviet policy frameworks as an 
informational process of goal-setting and control through feedback loops. Cybernetics was 
officially acclaimed as the Soviet science of governance. However, cybernetics failed to 
structurally reform Soviet policy: a severe shortage of computer technology prevented 
automation.20 Furthermore, the widespread practice of informal bargaining and economy of 
favors that thrived in Soviet ministries and enterprises was not conducive to any form of 
increased transparency and accountability.21 Managers resisted cybernetic automation of 
systems of communication and accounting, because it was perceived as a risk of revealing 
their illicit activities.22 If we were to apply this assumption on decision scientists, we would 
arrive at a similar conclusion: that decision sciences failed to undermine the personalist 
decision-making practice in the Soviet Union.  
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Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to interpret the incomplete cybernetization of the 
Soviet economy as a zero-sum game, thus as a failure. As I have argued elsewhere, Soviet 
cybernetics enabled the formation of a new normative understanding of what entails good, 
modern government. From the mid-1970s to conceptualize governance in the Soviet Union 
meant referring to cybernetic principles of an adaptive self-regulation through feedback loops 
through administration of enterprise, national and global policy systems, and emerging new 
practices of personnel management as an interactive social process.23 In this cybernetic 
governmental imagination, there was an intellectual and institutional place for decision 
sciences, which co-existed with the personalist world of decision making, scrutinized by 
Kremlinologists.  
We need to rediscover the intellectual history of the interdisciplinary field of Soviet 
decision science and understand the role of decision scientists as they have been a rather 
neglected type of the Soviet governmental actor. In doing this, I propose, that we can 
reconstruct the history of internal liberalization of Soviet governmental system, where 
decision science was used as a resource to limit the personalist but also institutional power of 
the Communist Party governing elites. It was through Soviet decision science that social, 
environmental and system-cybernetic control systems were brought together to form a new 
constellation of power and rationality beyond ideology, patronage and economy of favors; 
importantly, this process took place through an intense East-West circulation of people, 
technologies and ideas. Conceived in this way, the Soviet case should be approached as an 
integral part of the transnational development of modern scientific governance. 
  
Transnational development of postwar decision sciences: East-West 
Existing literature outlines the history of decision sciences as a principally Western 
phenomenon, with its roots in the major military conflict: it is widely documented that 
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operations research and systems analysis emerged from the military engineering, economic, 
and operations planning during World War II, while during the Cold War, American and 
European scientists applied their newly acquired expertise to aid decisions beyond military 
planning and strategy, turning to civil sectors of social and economic governance.24 
Historians, such as Philip Mirowski, David Jardini and S. M. Amadae, have argued that 
decision sciences s can be understood as an intellectual technology, instrumental in the 
struggle for world domination. As such, they assert, decision sciences s were part of modern 
governmentality in the sense that they underscored the use of science in areas that previously 
relied on political and bureaucratic authority.25 The political context for the rise of decision 
expertise, as suggested in the introduction to this volume, was crucial, because scientists and 
policy makers expected that decision sciences would serve as an antidote to a volatile, 
personalist decision-making, a structure of judgment associated with authoritarian 
dictatorships such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.26 It is important to note that the 
distinction between what was understood as an uninformed and personalist decision-making 
and scientific, disembodied decision-making was considered on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain. Indeed, the rise of Soviet decision sciences could also be understood as a response to 
informal, personalist decision making and an attempt to limit this practice by ensuring 
participation of scientific experts in policy process. 
The histories of the US cybernetics traced its particular career from the construction 
of automated weapon systems during the 1940s, such as anti-aircraft missile systems that 
relied on computational power to identify and attack targets, to the source of inspiration for 
attempts to fully automate decision-making in business, economic and social planning. If 
automated servomechanisms could track and shoot a plane, perhaps a computer system could 
steer a factory, an industry, or even a national economy? Although the pioneers of 
cybernetics, particularly Norbert Wiener, were strictly against the use of cybernetic theory in 
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the social forecasting,27 the idea of information loops enabling surveillance and feedback-
based control nonetheless spread throughout the disciplines, was reflected in the theories of 
political and social systems developed by Marshall McLuhan, Karl Deutsch, and David 
Easton, among others.28  In comparison with the US, the extension of the Soviet cybernetics 
to automation of decisions in the wide societal sectors was also a complex techno-political 
project, where multiple rationales intertwined.  
The postwar development of East-West relations in the area of decision sciences s can 
be divided into the following two stages: the height of the Cold War during the last seven 
years of Stalin’s rule (1946-1953) and the subsequent incremental re-establishment of 
contacts with the West and East-West technology transfers that were incrementally resumed 
after 1956.29 Under Stalin, research on the military and technical applications of decision 
sciences was strictly limited to defense and technical applications and was conducted in 
complete secrecy.30 Geopolitical tensions between the Soviet Union and United States pushed 
even the home-grown Soviet decision sciences into isolation: in 1946 Chairman of the 
Supreme Council Andrei Zhdanov banned any contacts with Western technoscience as part of 
the campaign against kowtowing to the West. Over the next five years, several major fields of 
scientific innovation, such as genetics, cybernetics, and relativity theory, were designated as 
pseudosciences and purged from Soviet academia. Nonetheless, as Gerovitch demonstrated, 
even under Stalin the Soviet government realized that computer science was vital for defense: 
the engineering of large technical systems in defense and aviation just could not do without 
cybernetic automation. Accordingly, computer science was insulated from these ideological 
attacks; but then, computer technology was strictly classified in the Soviet Union until the 
mid-1950s.31 Similarly, the early Soviet version of OR was developed in secret experimental 
construction bureaus within the military-industrial complex.  
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The late 1950s and early 1960s were defined by intense Soviet efforts to establish 
international cooperation in the field of decision sciences s. It was only after the death of 
Stalin in 1953 and Khrushchev’s rejection of Stalin’s personality cult in 1956 that the Soviet 
decision sciences would emerge into the daylight. The process of de-Stalinization resulted in 
manifold decision scientists returning from the secret science towns in which they had been 
sequestered to Moscow and other major cities in order to found new laboratories and 
institutes. The key turning point occurred in 1955, when the leading defense scientists and 
mathematicians Anatolii Kitov, Sergei Korolev and Aleksei Liapunov published an article 
defending cybernetics as a genuine science, which, they proclaimed, had nothing to do with 
capitalist ideology.32 The following decade saw the rapid development of Soviet research into 
computer technology and cybernetics, which were now praised in the press and policy 
programs as effective ways to modernize economic and social planning, management, and 
industrial production. Decision sciences became an integral part of an envisioned cybernetic 
future of communism. 
With the exception of the ideological disputes that occurred between the end of World 
War II and Stalin’s death, the trajectory of the Soviet decision sciences resembled the 
Western one. Mathematical methods, including OR and systems analysis, linear and 
nonlinear planning, and theories of optimal control and dynamic programming, were first 
transferred from the military-industrial complex to the realm of economic planning and 
management and, concomitantly, to the social sciences, which in the 1960s were still new 
disciplines in the Soviet Union.33 The spread of decision sciences s tapped into the modern 
belief, shared in both the East and West, in scientific rationalization and was assisted by 
international organizations, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, which disseminated the approach internationally from the early 1960s 
onward.34 By that time, however, Soviet research policy elites had been learning from and 
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interacting with leading Western institutions promoting the development of decision sciences 
s. 
As they were in the West, in the Soviet Union decision sciences s were expected to 
draw boundaries for personalist, dictatorial decisionism by creating a particular informational 
context and institutional legitimacy, defining what is a good decision. The institutional 
foundation for the Soviet decision sciences was established during the era of Nikita 
Khrushchev’s leadership (1953-1964), which was defined by a style of governance 
popularly—and ironically—known as “voluntarism,” in which Khrushchev overrode expert 
suggestions ruthlessly imposing what was described as his own “hare-brain schemes”, such 
as corn planting campaigns across all climate zones in the Soviet Union.35 However, as I have 
argued elsewhere, there were other actors in addition to Khrushchev, who were centrally 
important to the development of late Soviet governmentality. One such key person was 
Khrushchev’s minister and, later, prime minister, Aleksei Kosygin, a capable administrator, 
who  was crucially important for re-introducing scientific experts into economic planning and 
re-establishing East-West cooperation in the late 1950s.36 When Khrushchev was ousted in 
1964 to be replaced with Brezhnev, Kosygin acquired the central role in the Soviet 
policymaking. Decision sciences in particular were promoted by Kosygin’s son-in-law, 
Dzhermen Gvishiani, who served as a vice-chairman of the State Committee for Science and 
Technology (GKNT), the principal body in charge of the all-union policy of technoscientific 
development and East-West transfer. Gvishiani personally promoted management science 
and the emerging systems approach, having authored some of the first books on the subject in 
the Soviet Union.37 It was under the leadership of Kosygin and Gvishiani in the 1960s-1970s 
that Soviet decision science emerged as an academic field of applied and fundamental 




The institutionalization of Soviet decision sciences 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s a wide array of different scientific approaches, developed to 
aid management and policy making, came to be publicly promoted and institutionalized in the 
Soviet Union. These approaches included cybernetics, linear and non-linear planning, input-
output modelling, OR, scientific forecasting, and what would become known as the systems 
approach. Sometimes these techniques were gathered under the umbrella of cybernetics, and 
sometimes they were promoted as “mathematical methods” of governance. Starting in 1957, 
the Soviet press presented computers as a new technology able to speed up decisions and, 
from 1960, widely promoted the automation of management, describing the national 
economy as an informational system.38 Although in reality Soviet firms were severely 
underequipped with computer technology, a strong expectation of a computerized future was 
widely shared throughout the Soviet Union by the mid-1960s.39 
The first Soviet research unit dedicated to OR and game theory was founded in 1961 
at the Leningrad branch of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.40 The laboratory had a high 
profile and was visited by prominent Western scientists, including Oscar Morgenstern, one of 
the fathers of game theory, who visited the unit in 1963.41 East-West scientific exchanges had 
resumed in the late 1950s: in 1960, Norbert Wiener visited Moscow and gave a talk to an 
overcrowded auditorium; meanwhile, Soviet mathematicians, including the influential Vadim 
Trapeznikov, the director of the prestigious Institute of Automatics and Telemechanics, 
travelled to the U.S., returning deeply convinced of the need to apply OR and management 
science techniques to problems of governance.42 In the same year, Vassily Nemchinov, 
Leonid Kantorovich and Andrei Kolmogorov pushed for introduction of mathematical 
modelling into economics and planning.43 A fully-fledged network of Soviet OR institutes 
was initiated in 1964, when defense intellectuals E. Popov and Germogen S. Pospelov 
facilitated the establishment of OR as a research area in three major institutions: the 
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Computer Centre in Moscow, the Mathematical Institute at Novosibirsk branch of the 
Academy of Sciences, and the Institute of Cybernetics in Kiyv, Ukraine.  
Within the next few years OR was institutionalized in the republic branches of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, where OR was usually placed in computer science departments. 
Soviet universities also introduced OR into their curricula, while brochures, such as Georgii 
Smolian’s Operations Research: An Instrument of Effective Governance (1967) were 
published and disseminated widely by the main agency for the popularization of science, 
Znanie (knowledge). As Smolian’s text shows, the Soviet scientific leadership identified OR 
with the optimization of decisions through quantitative methods—such as game theory— 
ideally using computer technology.44 By the late 1960s, OR was entrenched in the Soviet 
academic system, and during the next decade, systems analysis would follow suit. 
The institutionalization of OR and systems analysis was part of a larger governmental 
reform to launch national planning of infrastructure and research and development on a large 
scale. In 1966, the same scientists who institutionalized OR, Glushkov and Pospelov, 
proposed to introduce a complex forecasting of the Soviet economy and technoscientific 
progress for a 5 to 10 years period into the state planning process. According to Dmitrii 
Efremenko, this proposal would have substantially increased the political role of scientific 
experts in the strategic decision making. However, although the proposal was supported by 
Kosygin and Dmitrii Ustinov, who was in charge of the military industrial complex and who 
later became the minister of Defense, it was turned down by the Politburo.45 Yet, OR and 
systems analysis, and in particular the work on optimization, following Wassily Leontief, 
Leonid Kantorovich and Vasily Nemchinov, would be later used for the development of the 
complex planning program of techno-scientific progress for 1980-2000, a giant document 
specifying national goals for the medium and long term with regards the entire Soviet 
economy, including science, which was drafted over the 1970s.46  
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The use of decision sciences s in economic planning had ambivalent consequences. 
As we will see, some pioneering scientists, such as Moiseev, became deeply disillusioned 
about the prospects of using these techniques to rationalize economic and social planning. 
Instead, they saw environmental governance as a more promising area of application for 
decision sciences s. This environmental turn in Soviet system-cybernetic governmentality has 
so far escaped the attention of historians of Soviet economics, for these new developments 
took place not so much in the economics institutes, but in the institutes involved in computer 
modelling of large, complex systems, which were home to the scientists who employed home 
OR and systems analysis.47  
While the 1950s-1960s saw the rise of OR and game theory, the period beginning 
with the late 1960s and the 1970s was characterized by the advance of what was called “the 
systems approach” (in Russian, sistemnyi podkhod).48 Like their Western counterparts, Soviet 
scientists developed a systemic approach to economic, industrial, environmental, and social 
analysis as an antidote to bureaucratic fragmentation and narrow-minded “technocratic” 
decision-making. The epistemology of the systems approach had both institutional and 
intellectual implications. First, the data and models of different industry branches, such as 
electric energy, mining, machine building and soon, had to be integrated, because no single 
industry branch could be planned optimally in isolation from other branches: the expansion of 
electric grid depended on the future factory siting, the construction of which had to take into 
consideration consumption and international trade forecasts. Second, system-based decision-
making required a historical and long-term view. Fast changes in technoscientific and social 
development required an ever greater capacity of prediction, but reliable prediction could 
only be made on the basis of extensive data sets about the past.49 In practice, systems 
epistemology underpinned Soviet decision scientists’ quest for increasing data transparency: 
scholars demanded wider access to different types of data, arguing that the sharing of data 
18 
 
across disciplines, institutes, and governmental agencies was the only way to produce reliable 
scientific expertise. Thus predictive epistemology forcefully introduced a new normative 
understanding of what constituted good governance, positing a need for new institutions 
capable of gathering and disseminating data not only within the Soviet Union, but also 
globally, exchanging the data with the West and developing countries.50  
Both the Soviet and US cases of introducing decision science into policy process 
point to a symbiotic relation between OR and the systems approach, though the intertwining 
of these fields in the Soviet Union has a history of its own. It is important to consider this pre-
history of the Soviet decision science, in order to fully appreciate the political legitimacy of 
this field in the Soviet context (which remained wary of kowtowing before the West) but 
because it explains the Soviet decision scientists’ fervor and the strength of the feeling of a 
mission which went beyond purely scientific inquiry. In the Soviet Union, the systems 
approach was rooted in local philosophical traditions, serving as a social glue for scientific 
communities. Soviet systems scholars were able to draw on the local legacy of systems-
thinking, which extended beyond Anglo-American OR to include interwar thought on 
geophysical, biological, and organizational systems.51 It is remarkable that in some cases 
Soviet systems thinkers saw the roots of their approach even in the nineteenth-century 
mystical tradition of Russian cosmism, a philosophical approach that sought to unite spiritual, 
human culture and geophysical planetary system into one eschatological worldview.52 
However, in the context of policy sciences, the most influential thinker was Vladimir 
Vernadskii, whose ideas about the integration and even systemic unity of geophysical 
systems of space, Earth, and human society would become extremely influential in Soviet 
debates about the global biosphere in the 1970s and beyond. Another key thinker was 
Aleksandr Bogdanov (Malinovskii), whose grand, albeit cumbersome, theory of tektology, 
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was invoked by postwar Russian scientists as a genuinely home-grown, Russian theory of 
organization.53  
It is important to notice that the key difference between inter- and postwar systems 
thinking was that, beginning in the 1960s, Soviet systems thinking fed directly into the policy 
sciences: a new normativity was coming into being, according to which one could not 
possibly make good decisions without considering complex systemic effects. While the 
Soviet OR field legitimized the introduction of mathematical methods into economic and 
social science, previously dominated by Marxism-Leninism, the systems approach posited a 
more complex view of governmental spheres, where mathematical methods could be applied. 
The systems approach, in general, was a balancing act between philosophical theorizing and 
applied science. As a result, there was no single, homogenous Soviet school in systems 
thinking; rather, divergent attitudes to systems research prevailed. First, prominent systems 
philosophers such as Igor’ Blauberg, Erik Iudin and Vadim Sadovskii were predominantly 
interested in the development of General Systems Theory and what they called a more 
descriptive, empirical theory of systems. Others, such as Stanislav Emel’ianov, Iurii Popkov, 
and Viktor Gelovani, shared a background in OR and electronic engineering and were 
concerned with concrete applications of systems theory to scientific research, governmental 
problems, and computer-based modelling. Finally, some scholars, such as Boris Mil’ner, 
pursued the economic application of the systems approach.54 
Systems analysis was institutionalized in the Soviet Union in response to what was 
perceived by scientists and policy makers as an emerging complex system: large scale 
infrastructure for oil and gas, industrial complexes such as nuclear power and chemical 
plants, but also large urban systems, as well as environmental projects, such as forestry, 
fisheries and agriculture.55 Now, the issues that emerged in all these very different sectors 
were understood as largely a-political and as such suitable for international cooperation over 
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the search for efficient solutions. It was to address all these complexities that new 
institutional frameworks for the production, processing and analysis of data and particularly 
its use for forecasting the future were developed. Participation in international cooperation 
was of paramount importance in all areas of Soviet science and technology, and decision 
science was no exception. Convinced that the planning of Soviet systems had to benefit from 
computer-assisted decision-making, the Soviet government continuously sought to import 
both technology and know-how from large Western, mainly US, corporations.56 The central 
actor in this process was the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), whose 
directors regularly met with Western CEOs to learn about their experiences with decision-
enhancement technologies. The first Soviet institutions dedicated to the systems approach 
appeared in the early 1970s, when the Committee for Systems Analysis was established at the 
Council of the Academy of Sciences, though the activities of this committee were limited to 
the circulation of information.57 It was not until 1976 that the main center for systems 
analysis, the All-Union Institute for Systems Research (VNIISI), was established in Moscow. 
The VNIISI attracted scientists from some of the leading research organizations in the Soviet 
Union, such as the GKNT’s institute and the Institute of Control Sciences.   
Decision sciences also served as a channel for Cold War diplomacy. Beginning in the 
1960s, the GKNT regarded the OR-based, quantitative systems approach as a strategically 
important field in East-West transfer. One of the key principles of nuclear, or indeed, any 
military strategy, is to ensure that one’s opponent used the same forms of thought so that one 
is able to communicate with and respond predictably to an adversary.58 This was made clear 
when in 1966 Lyndon B. Johnson suggested to Kosygin that the United States and Soviet 
Union establish an East-West think tank. It was American and Soviet decision scientists who 
were charged with realizing this diplomatic initiative. As a result, the International Institute 
of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) was established in Laxenburg, Austria, in 1972. Over 
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the course of the 1970s, the IIASA became an important transnational space that brought 
together American and Soviet scholars in management science. In addition, Soviet scientists 
had regular contacts with the Cowles Foundation, MIT’s Sloane School of Management, 
Stanford’s Graduate School of Business, and Harvard Business School.59 However, the 
internationalization of the Soviet decision sciences did not only proceed through Russian-
directed organizations: East-West contacts were also actively sought by scientists at the level 
of the satellite republics. For instance, in Lithuania an OR laboratory, directed by Eduardas 
Vilkas, who specialized in game theory, econometrics, and decision science, was founded in 
1967. Trained in Leningrad under Nikolai Vorob’ev, Vilkas spent four months as a visiting 
scientist at American universities, including the Cowles Foundation at Yale in 1976.60 Such 
lengthy stays were common in fields associated with decision sciences s, systems approach, 
and computing, and were crucial nodes for establishing informal ties that contributed to the 
transfer of knowledge. In this way, as I argue at length elsewhere, policy sciences were 
conducive to the emerging sociality and ethos of responsibility for global problems among 
the leading scholars from East and West.61  
Here the application of decision sciences to planning problems, including the regional 
and global environmental systems, which turned out to be the most conducive area for East-
West collaboration. A particularly important channel for East-West exchanges was 
UNESCO’s program, Man and Biosphere, which was launched in 1971 to gather the 
scientific data about the multiple impacts on the environment. Soviet membership in this 
program was encouraged by environmental scientists, such as soil expert Viktor Kovda, who 
was a close friend of the research director of the Computer Centre, Nikita Moiseev. Now, 
Moiseev quickly realized that by participating in Man and Biosphere, Soviet scientists could 
lobby for an integration of environmental science with computer modelling. From the mid-
1960s Moiseev developed OR applications for participatory decision making, intended to 
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combat the de facto existing fragmentation in the centralized planning.62 But later Moiseev 
became convinced about the need to change the entire conceptual apparatus of control. It is 
on this emerging thinking that I focus in the last section of this chapter. 
 
Self-regulation and pluralistic decisions in Soviet systems thinking 
Perhaps the most prominent example of Soviet OR and systems thinking is found in the 
writings and institutional entrepreneurship of Nikita Moiseev, a distinguished scientist who 
has left a deep legacy in the Russian science and intellectual culture, but has been overlooked 
in Western histories of science and technology. A mathematician by training, Moiseev was 
the long-standing vice-director for research of the Computer Centre at the All-Union 
Academy of Science and a patron of the Soviet OR community (a role reflected in his 
appointment as the honorary president of the first Russian OR Society, established in 
Moscow in 1996). Furthermore, Moiseev was a public figure, a prolific writer who extended 
the systems approach to what can be described as a philosophy of governance.  
Moiseev’s career was defined by a sustained effort to, first, foster the development of 
decision sciences s in the Soviet academia and, second, encourage their internationalization. 
In 1966, Moiseev established an OR laboratory at the Computer Centre and appointed a 
young and distinguished military scientist, and his former university roommate, Iurii 
Germeier as the director. Starting in the 1970s, Moiseev initiated and developed one of the 
foremost computer laboratories at the Computer Centre, where the first three dimensional 
computer model of the Earth system was created in the Soviet Union (this model contained 
subsystems reflexing land, atmosphere, and the ocean). However, due to space limitations, 
this section can only discuss Moiseev’s writings about the role of decision sciences s in what 
he described as a changing, increasingly complex world that posed unprecedented challenges, 
such as the exhaustion of natural resources, world population growth and pollution, to the 
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government. In contrast to narrow-minded Soviet technocrats, who resorted to ill-conceived 
scientific schemes of rationalization that often resulted in human and environmental 
casualties, Moiseev represented a rare, but influential, voice who championed uncertainty and 
complexity in the landscape of Soviet scientific expertise.  
In his 1970 book Mathematics, Government and Economics, which was translated 
into German in 1973, Moiseev argued that decision sciences could not offer simple solutions 
to governmental problems. This was because decision sciences—which addressed real world 
concerns—could not be shut off in a sterile laboratory environment, but must instead engage 
with social practices and institutional design. Decision sciences, he continued, were just as 
much about problem making as problem solving. Here Moiseev clearly posited decision 
sciences as a formative, productive governmental activity and not a mere aid, a devise for 
calculation and rationalization of political decision of the Party leaders. According to 
Moiseev, the first issue for decision sciences to consider was goal-setting, as defining what 
constitutes a desirable outcome was difficult to do in a policy and management context. 
Marrying theory and practice was another challenge, as finding an optimal solution to a 
problem did not mean solving it. The implementation of optimal planning required a well-
functioning system of coordination, involving the effective feedback of information and 
clearly established decision procedures.63 Optimal decision making could not merely be 
imposed on chaotic, unregulated practices, such as, for instance, competing enterprises or 
inefficient management, but required wider institutional and management reform. Decision 
sciences were but one functional component in the government of large systems, at the 
national and world level.  
From the 1960s the mainstream Soviet decision sciences were legitimized by the 
strong hope that their economic applications would save the stalling economic growth. Soviet 
decision theorists argued that the Soviet government could uniquely benefit from computer-
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assisted decision systems, as these were most appropriate in large organizations: only in 
large-scale economies could the automation of decisions enable the economization of 
resources.64 However, Moiseev recognized that even these economic planning-centred 
decisions could not be built “from simple blocks onto a complex whole”, but instead required 
grasping complex reality, something which could only be achieved through interdisciplinary 
cooperation among economists, management theorists, mathematicians, and sociologists.65 In 
this way, decision sciences at least theoretically were far from a detached intellectual 
technology, but an integral component, if not a driving force, of social and organizational 
change. 
An important part of decision sciences, particularly computer-based modelling, 
posited an epistemological connection between theoretical political economy and the practice 
of planning, in which the latter could challenge theoretical dogmas even in the Soviet Union. 
Hardly any Soviet scholar could get away with positing the superiority of computer-assisted 
decision sciences without making obligatory references to Marxism: even Moiseev wrote that 
Marx’s model of production and consumption was “the first macroeconomic model” ever 
(although they hardly ever attributed much intellectual significance to these references 
considering them a mere rhetoric convention).66 Nonetheless, Moiseev went so far as to 
dismiss Marx’s model as outdated and irrelevant to decision sciences: “Karl Marx’s model 
was created to study a specific process under specific conditions (…) Accordingly, it can not 
be used to study those processes, which are defined by different conditions. For example, 
Karl Marx’s model cannot answer a question how to distribute investment in order to achieve 
a certain level of consumption. As we have pointed out earlier, Karl Marx’s model does not 
include governance: [for Marx] the initial state singularly determines all outcomes”.67 
Meanwhile, wrote Moiseev, “contemporary macroeconomic models seek to study precisely 
the impact of ‘governing’ factors on the flow of economic processes”.68 Moiseev is very clear 
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here stating that “Highly aggregated models, such as Karl Marx’s, cannot be used directly in 
planning” (he does add then highly aggregated models can still be of practical use for a very 
long-term planning).69 Now, what is left after Marxist political economy is deemed 
insufficient? Moiseev proposes to bridge the gap between Marxist political economy and 
everyday decisions that are made by the Gosplan by the policy sciences: sophisticated 
modelling, offering aggregate models to enable long-term forecasting as they reveal general 
trends, while multi-branch models helped to shape the plan indicators of the economic 
development.70  
Furthermore, because computer modelling was conceptually anchored in systems 
theory, it became possible for Moiseev to legitimately introduce the ideas of autonomy and 
heterogeneous purposive behavior in the models of Soviet society. For Moiseev, Soviet 
society was a system comprised of many different and autonomous decision makers, which 
social planning theories had to take into consideration. For instance, Moiseev wrote that “the 
economic organism of any state consists of a whole [set] of smaller economic organisms, 
which are to lesser or greater extent autonomous and are interlinked with each other into a 
complex hierarchical system of relations. Every element in this whole has both a certain will 
(ability to make decisions) and certain individual interests (goals)”.71 It is therefore only 
logical, Moiseev continued, that 
“Society seeks to achieve multiple goals. These goals are not only incomparable, but 
they are also changing, because our society does not live in a thermostat, but on the 
Earth, where the conditions for life are not stable. The situations which emerge and 
influence life activities very often are not only out of [humans’] control, but also 
unpredictable”.72 
Although Moiseev himself does not specify the political implications of his epistemological 
argument, this quote hints at his opinion that the existing practice of the Party ideological 
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leadership in the setting of goals for long-term future and centralized planning are 
inconsistent with the basic organization of human society. Perhaps unwilling to push the 
boundaries too far, Moiseev restricted his argument to the criticism of the complete 
automation of decision making. According to Moiseev, to delegate all decisions to a 
computer was impossible, partially because real time information processing could never be 
achieved: thus even a decision-making computer would never be able to “run with the 
system”. But more importantly, Moiseev claimed that a viable system required what he called 
“a degree of freedom”. A complex social system was not the sum of its parts, but rather a 
complex interaction, the complexity of which could never be known because it was changing 
continuously and, ultimately, chaotically. The only reasonable way for a decision-maker to 
deal with complexity, posited Moiseev, was to recognize that subsystems required autonomy 
for their activities, autonomy being a necessary condition for the emergence of “collective 
wisdom and collective energy” of the system as a whole.73 
Moiseev’s work suggests that, by the year 1970, Soviet decision scientists 
fundamentally transformed the Stalinist model of personalized governance. Governance was 
no longer understood as a personalized system, where the leader or the Party gave direct 
orders to society. According to decision sciences  point of view, the Soviet leadership could 
only function if it made use of proxies of scientific expertise. Economic planners required 
highly complex representations of the economy, multi-level models produced by scientific 
experts. Social planners had to consider society’s view on the developmental goals set by the 
CPSU, but the social sciences and the humanities were needed to make sense of these 
views.74 Did this scientific epistemology threaten the Party’s monopoly over power? Moiseev 
made certain to avoid creating this impression: he cautioned that the scientific formulation of 
alternative decisions and their evaluation were merely “advisory”, while the “final decisions” 
could only be taken by those “responsible for the country”.75 Nevertheless, in spite of the 
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subordinate role Moissev posited for scientific expertise, being both conceptual and 
institutional, this proxy of modelling became an increasingly significant field, nurturing 
ideas, practices and actors that transformed Soviet governance.  
While we need further studies of the impact of OR and systems analysis on Soviet 
economic and social planning, Moiseev’s work suggests that the Soviet landscape of 
economic governance was highly polarized. Some some scientists promoted mathematical 
applications as technical fixes for economic problems, while others doubted simple 
mathematical models could address such issues. Moiseev was one of the sceptics. He called 
into question the very idea that there could be an optimal planning of the national economy as 
early as in 1970, writing that it was not possible to discern the optimal course of the Soviet 
economy because economies were relational and models of the world economy were not yet 
available.76 Moiseev asserted that Soviet econometricians disregarded the fact that the notion 
of optimum is a fundamentally relational notion. It is only possible to establish an optimal 
value in one sector, such as machine production, while systematically considering the other 
values that emerge as a result of processes in related sectors, such as markets, energy, and 
natural resources. It is impossible to establish an optimal value in a subsystem of the 
economy without having a model of the whole national economy and, moreover, a model of 
the world economy. Pointing out to this complexity, Moiseev did not argue against the idea 
of optimal planning as such, but rather called for conceptual consistency. An important 
implication of striving for such a conceptual consistency was a step toward a more integrated, 
relational, but at the same time more open vision of a firm, a region, and, finally, the entire 
Soviet Union.  
However, when the first econometric models of the world economy were introduced 
in the 1970s, Moiseev continued to doubt if the Soviet government could benefit from this 
type of decision aid. In 1980, in his confidential letter to Dzhermen Gvishiani, the vice-
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chairman of GKNT, Moiseev could not be more blunt: “I think that the use of econometric 
methods for the evaluation of more or less long term evolution of economic situation is not 
particularly promising. Indeed, econometrics offers only a snapshot of a given situation. 
Accordingly, any extrapolation that is based on them, can only be more or less reliable in 
relatively short term, a quarter or one year”.77 To sum up, Soviet decision science posited the 
reality of multiple decision makers and impossibility of decision-making in an institutionally 
fragmented context where data was not shared across sectors, countries and time periods.  
 
Conclusion 
The Soviet decision sciences were much more than a Party instrument, being developed and 
promoted by as an alternative social theory of order and change. Their development had 
important political and governmental implications. The very purpose of OR was to replace 
the everyday, ideological language used in government decision-making with a mathematical 
language and models that could be used to describe governmental problems and formulate 
solutions.78 Whereas in the West scientificization of governmental discourses was criticized 
as a problematic limitation of the possibility for non-specialists to participate in decision-
making, in the Soviet Union the same process had an important, and potentially 
democratizing, side effect. Mathematical language of governance implicitly constrained the 
CPSU’s capacity to make decisions single-handedly. Intermediaries – policy scientists – were 
required to step in. Accordingly, these intermediaries became increasingly aware about the 
importance of reflexive forms of scientific rationalization of governmental practices. Soviet 
decision sciences required social organization, enlightenment and cooperation among 
different disciplinary actors, scientific and political elites. In the authoritarian context, this 
was a liberalizing revolution, albeit a quiet one, one that spoke in formulas and not 
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ideological slogans and that developed in informal circles of scientific elites and not in public 
squares. 
 Similarly to the United States, the governmental revolution of Soviet decision 
sciences produced its avant-garde and rear-garde. Not all systems scientists were inclined to 
view the world as a reflexive, adaptive system; they sought instead safety in the authority of 
technoutopia: computers, mathematical models, and formal theorizing that took place in safe 
laboratory spaces. At the beginning of my chapter, I quoted a poem written by Oleg Larichev, 
who would become an academician and leading Russian scientist in the Artificial 
Intelligence, which was published in a special issue of the principal systems research 
yearbook in the Soviet Union, published by VNIISI in the 1970s-1980s. Larichev warns a 
systems engineer not to rely too heavily on results generated by computer modelling. These 
lines capture well the spirit of at least some Soviet scientists who adopted the systems 
approach and modelling as an open inquiry into the organization of society and nature, at the 
same time warning against a temptation to seek for quick fixes in decision sciences. This 
warning, albeit issued 36 years ago, today is still valid for policy makers both in East and 
West. It is also a reminder for historians of scientific governance to take into account 
reflexive and social construction of science, as abstract models may harbor quiet revolutions.  
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